In verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes (VMSSs), many secrets can be shared but only one share is kept by each user and this share is verifiable by others. In this paper, we propose two secure, efficient, and verifiable (t, n) multi-secret sharing schemes, namely Scheme-I and Scheme-II. Scheme-I is based on the Lagrange interpolating polynomial and the LFSR-based public key cryptosystem. The Lagrange interpolating polynomial is used to split and reconstruct the secrets and the LFSR-based public key cryptosystem is employed to verify the validity of the data. Scheme-II is designed according to the LFSR sequence and the LFSR-based public key cryptosystem. We compare our schemes with the state-of-theart in terms of attack resistance, computation complexity, and so on, and conclude that our schemes have better performance and incur less computation overhead. Our schemes can effectively detect a variety of forgery or cheating actions to ensure that the recovery of the secrets is secure and creditable, and the length of the private key is only one third of that of others for the same security level.
Introduction
Secret sharing has become one of the most important research areas in modern cryptography since it was proposed in 1979 [1, 2] . Nowadays it has been widely adopted by many emerging applications, including opening a bank vault, launching a nuclear attack, transferring electronic funds, to name a few. Secret sharing plays a significant role in protecting secret information from becoming lost, being destroyed/altered, or falling into the wrong hands [3, 4] .
Several drawbacks of the original (t, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes [1, 2] have been identified [5] , which are listed as follows:
1. Each secret sharing process involves only one to-be-shared secret. 2. The secret shares can be used only once. After a secret is recovered, the dealer must redistribute a fresh share, also known as a shadow, over a secure channel to every participant. 3. These schemes assume that the dealer and the participants are honest. Nevertheless, a dishonest dealer may distribute a fake shadow to a certain participant, and a malicious participant may provide a fake share to other participants. Such behaviors can significantly affect the effectiveness of secret sharing schemes.
To overcome the first two drawbacks, multi-secret sharing (MSS) was proposed [6] [7] [8] [9] . Such a scheme requires that multiple secrets are shared and each participant holds one share of each secret. For example, the multistage secret sharing scheme proposed in [6] employs a one-way function to overcome the second drawback, while the YCH scheme [9] utilizes a two-variable one-way function based Shamir's secret sharing [1] to tackle both drawbacks. Although MSS schemes have many useful applications [10] [11] [12] [13] , they cannot verify the honesty of either the dealer or the participants, which means that they cannot handle the scenarios where dishonest dealers and/or participants exist.
The third drawback is tackled by adding the concept of verifiability. In verifiable multi-secret sharing (VMSS), the validity of the shares can be verified; hence dishonesty of the participants and/or the dealer can be identified. The realization of VMSS was first presented by Chor et al. [5] in 1985, and then further investigated by many other researchers [14] [15] [16] [17] . In 2005, Shao and Cao [18] introduced the discrete logarithm (DL) into the YCH scheme [9] , which is believed to be relatively efficient but does not have the property of verification, to yield an efficient verifiable multi-secret sharing. This new scheme requires the dealer to distribute one secret shadow to each participant over a secure channel. Later, in 2007, Zhao et al. [19] proposed a practical VMSS termed ZZZ, which combines the YCH scheme with the Hwang-Chang (HC) scheme [20] to employ the RSA cryptosystem and the Diffie-Helman key agreement mechanism. The ZZZ scheme does not need a secure channel, but this benefit comes with a high computation overhead. In 2008, Dehkordi and Mashhadi [13, 21] presented two efficient VMSS schemes, which employ the intractability of the discrete logarithm and the RSA cryptosystem to improve the YCH scheme. But these two schemes are too resource-intensive, resulting in lower speeds. In 2010, a new VMSS scheme based on the cellular automata theory [22] was proposed. This scheme has a linear computational complexity, but it fails to resist certain attacks such as the conspiracy attack, as analyzed in this paper.
We present two novel efficient VMSS schemes in this paper, denoted by Scheme-I and Scheme-II, to overcome the three drawbacks mentioned above. To split and reconstruct the secrets, Scheme-I adopts the Lagrange interpolating polynomial while Scheme-II utilizes the homogeneous LFSR sequence. The verification phases of both schemes exploit the LFSR public key cryptosystem and the LFSR-based public key distribution [23, 24] . Our analysis indicates that these two schemes are computationally secure and efficient. For the same strength of security, the lengths of the private keys obtained from our schemes are only one-third of those computed by others. Note that the validation of Scheme-I and Scheme-II are established on the different theories in comparison with the previously proposed schemes.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the homogeneous LFSR sequence and the thirdorder LFSR are briefly introduced. A review of the YCH scheme is also given in this section. We propose our schemes and analyze their feasibility in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 detail our security analysis and performance analysis, respectively. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the homogeneous LFSR sequence, the third-order LFSR, the LFSR public-key cryptosystem, and the YCH scheme.
Homogeneous LFSR Sequence
Let F = GF (p), where p is a prime. Denote by f (x) = x t − c 1 x t−1 − · · · − c t−1 x − c t a polynomial over F , with c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c t being constants in F . We say that s = {s k | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , } is a homogeneous LFSR sequence of order t (generated by f (x)) if s satisfies the following linear recursive relation: 
We are particularly interested in the sequence u j+t = 
,
is a polynomial with a degree t,
When the characteristic equation
From the partial fraction decomposition theorem, we have
where A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A t are constants computed from c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c t , and 
where 
From the partial fraction decomposition theorem, Eq. (9) can be decomposed as follows:
Now we examine each term in the equation,
(
Thus
Therefore
where A j is a polynomial with degree m j − 1. This completes the proof.
The third-order LFSR sequence
Now we consider the third-order LFSR sequence [23, 24] .
where a, b ∈ F , be an irreducible polynomial over F = GF (p). A sequence s = {s k } is said to be a third-order LFSR sequence with the characteristic polynomial f (x) if its elements satisfy Assume that α 1 , α 2 , α 3 are the three roots of f (x) = 0 over F . According to Newton's formula, the elements of s can be represented as follows by the symmetric kth-power sum of the roots:
Let us denote the period of f (x) by per(f ). Notice that if f (x) is irreducible over F , the period of s(f ) is equal to per(f ).
The following results have been proved in [23, 24] .
, and s be the characteristic sequence generated by
+ bx − 1 be a polynomial over F , and s be the characteristic sequence generated by f (x). For all integers k and e, the k-th term of the characteristic sequence generated by the polynomial f e equals the e-th term of the characteristic sequence generated by the polynomial f k , which in turn equals the (ke)-th term of the characteristic sequence generated by the polynomial f (x). In other words,
Proof. Assume that α 1 , α 2 , α 3 are the three roots of f (x) in the extension field GF (p 3 ). Let s be the characteristic sequence generated by f (x). Then
Thus the k-th term of the characteristic sequence generated by the polynomial f e (x) can be expressed by
This proves the theorem. 
The LFSR-based public key cryptosystem
In this section, we illustrate the LFSR public key cryptosystem using the third-order characteristic sequences over Z N . We choose two primes p and q such that N = pq. Then the period of the irreducible polynomial is δ = (p
All computations here are performed in Z N . 
Let PK 1 and PK 2 be two public-key cryptosystems that are based on the key spaces G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Denote by #G 1 (#G 2 ) the number of elements in G 1 (G 2 ). From the theory of cryptography, the public key and private key have the same key space in any public key cryptosystem. Assume that for the same security level we have
Definition 1.
The compression ratio of the private key (public key) in PK 2 with respect to that in PK 1 is r.
Theorem 6. The compression ratio of the private key (public key) in an LFSR-based public key cryptosystem is 3 compared to a typical public key cryptosystem over GF (p). This indicates that the number of bits for the private key (public key) of the LFSR-based public key cryptosystem is one-third of that in a system over GF (p) for the same security level.
Proof. The LFSR-based public key cryptosystem is based on the third-order LFSR sequence over GF (p), which has the same security level as one over GF (p 3 ). From Definition 1, the compression ratio of the private key (public key) in an LFSR-based public key cryptosystem is r =
= 3 compared with any typical public key cryptosystem over GF (p).
Review of the YCH scheme
In this section, we briefly review a very popular (t, n)-threshold scheme, the YCH scheme [9] . Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k be the k secrets to be shared. Denote by f (r, w) any two-variable one-way function. The dealer randomly selects n secret shadows w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n and distributes w i to participant M i via a secure channel. Then the dealer randomly picks up an integer r and computes f (r, w i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Next, it performs the following steps.
If k ≤ t.
1. Choose a large prime q satisfying S i < q for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, select integers a j such that 0 < a j < q for j = 1, 2, . . . , t − k, and then construct the following (t − 1)-th degree polynomial h(x) mod q:
If k > t.
1. Choose a large prime q satisfying S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k < q, then construct the following (k − 1)-th degree polynomial
For a (t, n)-threshold scheme, we need the secret shares of at least t participants to recover the k secrets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k . These participants pool their shares f (r, w i ), based on which the polynomial h(x) mod q can be uniquely determined as follows:
Verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme
In this section, we propose two new verifiable (t, n) multi-secret sharing schemes, denoted by Scheme-I and Scheme-II, based on the LFSR sequence, the three-order LFSR public key cryptosystem, and Shamir's scheme. In [23] the plain text is encrypted over the LFSR base element, while in our proposed schemes the plain text is encrypted over the exponent element.
Scheme-I

Initialization phase
We adopt the same notations as those used in the YCH scheme and denote by S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k the k secrets to be shared. 
Construction phase
The dealer selects an integer e 0 from the interval [ 
Recovery and verification phase
4. Recover the secrets: the polynomial h(x) mod q 1 can be uniquely determined as follows:
Scheme-II
Similarly to Scheme-I, Scheme-II does not require the establishment of a secure channel between each participant and the dealer. Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k be the k secrets to be shared. First, the dealer chooses two strong primes p and q and computes N = pq. Second, it selects two positive integers a and b to get f (x) = x 
Construction phase
The dealer performs the following steps. 
5.
Recovery and verification phase
Now we shall show how a participant can verify other participants' cheating actions and how t honest participants can recover the shared secrets. (s e 0 (a, b), s −e 0 (a, b) ) to get the share, where e i is the shadow of M i . 
Each participant M i computes I
′ i = s e i
The participant can verify I
We could take one of the following two methods to recover the shared secrets. 
From Theorem 2, we obtain u j = P(j)α j mod q 1 for all j ≥ t and the shared secrets can be computed by
Method 2:
From Theorem 2, we can solve the following system of equations: (15) to gain the unique solution P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t . Then we could obtain u i = (P 1 + P 2 i + · · · + P t i t−1 )α i mod q 1 for ∀i ≥ t and recover the shared secrets based on the formula S i = u i+n + r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Feasibility analysis
We shall analyze the feasibility of the share generation algorithm and the verification algorithm in Scheme-I and Scheme-II in this subsection.
1. In both schemes, it is absolutely impossible for the dealer to become a cheater. Because each participant selects its own shadow independently, we do not need a verification process between the dealer and the participants. 2. In both schemes, each participant M i computes I
participants can use the published I ′ i . Moreover, every participant can reuse his/her own shadow.
In verification, if a participant M i does not have a cheating action, s d (I
′ i ) = s d (s e i (s e 0 (a, b), s −e 0 (a, b))) = s de 0 (s e i (a, b), s −e i (a, b)) = s e i (a, b) since de 0 = 1 mod δ; otherwise, M i might be a cheater.
Security analysis
Our schemes are based on the security of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the LFSR sequence, and the third-order LFSR public key cryptosystem. In this section, we analyze the security strengths of the proposed schemes by examining how they can counter several major possible attacks.
Security of Scheme-I
The security of Scheme-I is based on that of the third-order LFSR-based public key cryptosystem [23] and that of Shamir's secret sharing scheme [1] . Our analysis on the security of Scheme-I is presented below. If plotter E wants to use fewer than t shares to reconstruct the polynomial h(x) mod q 1 , the hardness is equivalent to the case that E successfully breaks Shamir's scheme, as Scheme-I is based on the security of Shamir's scheme. Analysis: Assume that the plotter E intends to get the secret shadow e i of the participant M i from the public information I ′ i and (s e i (a, b), s −e i (a, b) ). E can compute I (s e 0 (a, b), s −e 0 (a, b) ), and form the polynomial f e i =
+ s −e 0 x − 1 is irreducible, f e i is also irreducible according to Lemma 3. Assume that α and β are the roots of f e 0 and f e i , respectively. Then β = α e i . Once α and β are known, deriving the exponent e i is equivalent to computing the discrete logarithm in GF (p 3 ). Solving the discrete logarithm in GF (p 3 ) is much harder than that in GF (p). As we know that the discrete logarithm problem is NP-complete, it is secure to reuse the secret shadow.
Security of Scheme-II
Attack 1: t − 1 or fewer participants try to recover the secrets. + bx − 1 is irreducible over F , f e i is also irreducible according to Lemma 3. Assume that α and γ are the roots of f and f e i , respectively. Then β = γ e i . Once α and γ are known, deriving the exponent e i is equivalent to computing the discrete logarithm, which is an NP-complete problem. Therefore it is secure to reuse the secret shadow, which means that the attacker could not reveal e i from the public information. Attack 3: The attacker tries to reveal the secret share I i from the public information s e 0 and s e i . , b) ), the attacker must try to reveal e i and e 0 first.
Analysis:
From Lemma 3, the security of e 0 and e i is based on the discrete logarithm problem. Thus it is impossible for the attacker to reveal I i from s e 0 and s e i . (a, b) ). According to Lemma 3, computing e j from I j needs solution of the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore it is absolutely impossible for any participant to get other participants' secret shadows.
To complete this section, we compare the security strengths of Scheme-I and Scheme-II with those of the two schemes (Type 1 and Type 2) in [21] and the scheme in [22] in terms of countering the resistance attack. The results are reported in Table 1 .
Performance analysis
In this section, we discuss several important properties and analyze the performance of the proposed schemes.
Advantages of the proposed schemes
1. Multiple secrets can be reconstructed simultaneously within a secret sharing session. 2. Each qualified subset of participants is able to compute the shared secrets while the unqualified ones cannot obtain any information about the secrets. 3. The knowledge of any t or more shares suffices to reconstruct the secrets and the knowledge of fewer than t shares is not enough to reconstruct the secrets; i.e. Scheme-I and Scheme II are (t, n)-threshold schemes.
4. Each participant is allowed to check the validity of the shares of other participants and itself; i.e. our schemes are verifiable. 5. Traditionally the dealer should also be verifiable as some/all of the participants may be prevented from reconstructing the original secrets due to the dishonesty of the dealer. Thus each participant is allowed to check whether the dealer is honest when distributing the shadows. However, in our schemes, the participants choose their own shadows, making it impossible for the dealer to cheat them. Therefore we do not need to verify the validity of the dealer. 6. The shadow of each participant will never be disclosed in the recovery and verification phases and its reuse is secure; i.e.
our schemes are multi-use schemes.
Computational complexity
It is obvious that the most time-consuming phases in our schemes are the verifiable phase and the recovery phase. In this subsection, we discuss the security and computational complexity of these two phases and compare our schemes with others. Table 2 A comparative analysis of the characteristics of our schemes and those in [21, 22] .
Property
Type1 [21] Type2 [21] Scheme in [22] Scheme-I Scheme-II 
Verifiable phase
The two schemes (Type 1 and Type 2) in [21] are based on the RSA cryptosystem, with Type 1 requiring each participant to have one exponent while Type 2 needs n exponents. The RSA encryption takes O(N 3 ) unless small encryption exponents are used. The scheme in [22] is based on the discrete logarithm problem. Our schemes are based on the LFSR-based public key cryptosystem. Each participant M i chooses e i as its secret shadow according to the underlying cryptosystem, with e i being the private key, and the public key s e i (a, b) being published. Note that the scheme in [22] and our schemes all require each participant to choose its own shadow, therefore it is impossible for the dealer to cheat. However, the key length in our schemes is much shorter. Considering a 1024-bit finite field at the same security level, the length of the private key can be represented by 340 bits in our schemes while the private key in [21, 22] is three times longer.
Recovery phase
In our schemes, the recovery phase is the most time-consuming one. In Scheme-I, participants take the Lagrange interpolation polynomial to distribute secrets. The n-th degree polynomial can be reconstructed in time O(n 2 ) by using Lagrange interpolation. Therefore the recovery phase in Scheme-I can be reconstructed in time O(t 2 ) when t ≥ k or O(k 2 ) when t < k. In Scheme-II, there exist two methods to recover the secrets, with the first one taking time O(t 2 ). We can solve the t simultaneous equations in the second method in time O(t 2 ), which is much faster than Scheme-I when k > t. Table 2 illustrates a comparative analysis of the characteristics of our schemes and those in [21, 22] .
Dynamic multi-secret sharing
In our proposed schemes, the participant M i , the secret e i , etc., can be dynamically operated. In this section, we discuss the scheme by considering a dynamic refresh, delete, and addition in accordance with practical settings. 2. When we need to delete a participant M del , the dealer only needs to erase s del (a, b) and Id del . If the deleted participant M del wants to adopt its s del to reconstruct the secret, it could not pass the verification.
Conclusions
Based on the LFSR sequence, we have proposed two new and efficient verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes in this paper. Our schemes have the same advantages compared to the previous ones, but have better performance and shorter private/public key length in comparison with those in [21, 22] for the same security level. Analyses indicate that our schemes are computationally secure and efficient. Moreover, they are easy to implement and are applicable in practical settings.
Our future research lies in the following two directions. First, we intend to design a better VMSS, which has less computation and storage requirements but is better suited for practical situations. Second, we will investigate how to dynamically operate our schemes when a new secret is inserted or an old secret is deleted. This is a very important question with a lot of practical applications.
